According to the official calendar established by the National Independent Electoral Commission
November 16, 2023 — A disputed election marred by irregularities, violence, human rights violations, opaque financial flows, and allegations of electoral corruption. In an effort to inform the public, Transparency International – Initiative Madagascar (TI-MG) has published an estimate of the financial resources mobilized by the candidates in the race.
On election day, November 16, 2023, Malagasy voters faced an unprecedented situation. The election, criticized by a portion of the population, featured only 3 out of the 13 official candidates. It remains unclear whether any of the 49 recommendations made by independent auditors who reviewed the electoral roll—submitted to the electoral commission (CENI) in July 2023—were considered or implemented.
Acts of violence and the shrinking of civic space over the preceding five weeks, combined with institutional manipulation, reinforced the image of a lawless state captured by private interests—one where the word “democracy” appears to be a mere illusion.
The Election Monitoring Unit (Cellule de Suivi des Élections, CSE) of Transparency International – Initiative Madagascar has been working tirelessly since the start of the campaign. This unit, made up of a “field” team and a “media and social media” team, has been active in all six provincial capitals as well as in Taolagnaro. It is run by TI-MG staff and volunteers, with support from the Legal Aid and Citizen Action Centers (CAJAC) and investigative journalists from the NGO MALINA.
An initial analysis was published on October 31, followed by the current report, which is based on an enhanced methodology detailed below.
FRAMING AND METHODOLOGY
According to the official calendar set by the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), the electoral campaign began on October 10, 2023, for a period of thirty (30) days, extended by one week after the Constitutional High Court (HCC) postponed the first round to November 16. During the first two weeks of this period, only two candidates actively campaigned: Andry Nirina Rajoelina (Candidate No. 3) and Sendrinson Daniela Raderanirina (Candidate No. 11). They were later joined on October 22 by Candidate No. 13, Siteny Randrianasoloniaiko, who had previously been part of the collective of candidates who had chosen not to campaign in order to press their demands.
A candidate expenditure monitoring framework was developed by TI-MG based on international best practices. While the first analysis focused on media-related political advertising expenditures (television, radio, print) and non-media expenses mainly related to field travel and campaign rallies, this second analysis includes an estimate of the human resources mobilized by the candidates, as well as an assessment of the cost of actions considered as electoral corruption. Expense estimates are based on both direct observations (e.g., attending rallies) and secondary sources (e.g., analysis of photographs, etc.), followed by extrapolation, given that TI-MG’s Election Monitoring Unit (CSE) is limited in staff and resources and cannot track all of the candidates’ movements. The advertising rate cards of the observed media outlets, along with price catalogs for standard campaign materials (printing, sound systems, vehicles, etc.), were collected in advance to ensure the highest possible accuracy in calculations.
With regard to electoral corruption, TI-MG relies on testimonies collected by MALINA, cross-verified reports, field observations by its monitors, and events reported in the news and on social media.
Another innovation is the inclusion of a dedicated section on irregularities in the electoral roll, based on audits previously conducted by third parties, all of which are publicly available.
The main objectives of this approach are to :
TI-MG presents below a summary of the suspicious activities identified during the 2023 electoral campaign:
Witness Statements Reveal Distribution of Cash and Campaign Materials at Candidate No. 3’s Headquarters
Witness statements report the distribution of cash and the provision of campaign materials at the headquarters of Candidate No. 3, conditional upon the submission of a party membership card. TI-MG has chosen to categorize this practice under “other” campaign expenditures, given that each party theoretically has the right to recruit activists (whether volunteers or compensated supporters) and provide compensation for their “involvement.” However, the practice remains condemnable due to its lack of transparency and the principle it embodies: the targeted activists, who often come from economically vulnerable backgrounds, are recruited not for their alignment with the candidate’s ideology, but because of their financial hardship. This constitutes nothing more than the exploitation of poverty for campaign purposes—a morally unacceptable practice.
Potential conflicts of interest and collusion between members of the CENI and the HCC and Candidate No. 3 or his close associates have also been raised and analyzed, further deepening existing concerns expressed by numerous observers regarding the possible capture of these institutions and, therefore, their lack of independence and impartiality.
Violations of Fundamental Rights During the Distribution of “Gifts” Documented in Antananarivo
Violations of fundamental rights were committed during the distribution of “gifts,” at least in Antananarivo, on October 14, 2023. On that day, Candidate No. 3 organized the distribution of food supplies in several fokontany of the capital. Meal tickets bearing the name, photo, and address of each recipient were printed and delivered by fokontany agents directly to the homes of selected individuals—primarily low-income residents. A field investigation established that this personal data had been directly extracted from fokontany records and printed without the consent of the individuals concerned.
This Case Raises Questions About the Responsibility and Involvement of Fokontany Chiefs and Their Staff
This case also raises concerns regarding the responsibility and involvement of the fokontany chiefs and their collaborators in this harmful scheme. It seems unlikely that Candidate No. 3’s party or anyone else could have accessed fokontany registers without their approval. Such access would constitute a violation of Article 57 of Law No. 2018-008 dated April 10, 2018, concerning the general framework of elections and referenda, which establishes the principle of administrative neutrality and impartiality of public services.
Article 60 of this law clearly states that “it is forbidden for any civil or military official and unregulated agent of the State and decentralized territorial collectivities, who are subject to obligations of neutrality, attendance, full-time service, and honesty, under the penalties provided in Article 227 of this Organic Law for electoral propaganda offenses, to participate in an electoral campaign to promote a candidate, a list of candidates, or an option.”
This prohibition also applies to numerous officials currently in office who have openly campaigned for one candidate or another. If such practices were widespread across all fokontany, what guarantee would there be for the sincerity and reliability of the November 16 electoral operations, which largely depend on the personnel at each polling station—often recruited from the fokontany staff ?
In the Atsimo Andrefana Region, Teachers Were Massively Mobilized by the Sakaraha CISCO Chief to Campaign for Candidate No. 3
Similarly, in Mandoto, CISCO staff and teachers were ordered to close schools to attend Candidate No. 3’s political rally on November 14, 2023. What if such practices were widespread across all 114 CISCO offices in Madagascar ?
In the Taolagnaro district, testimonies report that voter card numbers were recorded on lists in exchange for promises of receiving Vatsy Tsinjo and Tosika Fameno aid once Candidate No. 3 was elected. A similar situation occurred in Toamasina, where voters were “invited” to provide campaign operatives of Candidate No. 3 with copies of their voter cards, national identity cards, and ID photos, and to register on designated lists in exchange for the promise of monthly assistance if Candidate No. 3 won.
An attendance sheet collected by MALINA investigators shows that during a meeting on October 30, 2023, led by the Governor of the Vakinankaratra region, regional directors of several ministries and public services (including JIRAMA) convened in Antsirabe with emissaries from Candidate No. 3’s headquarters at ARENA to organize local campaign events.
On October 18, 2023, a credit notice for one billion Ariary in favor of the Governor of Vakinankaratra was traced at the Antsirabe General Treasury.
These incidents raise fundamental questions about the transparency and integrity of Madagascar’s electoral system. The dice appear to have been loaded well in advance, with every possible means deployed to ensure Candidate No. 3’s forced victory.
ANALYSIS
The massive distribution of “gifts” to administrations by the Ntsay government—and thus by the Rajoelina camp—that has been ongoing since at least the beginning of 2023, has not been accounted for here. It is likely that these “gifts” were funded by grants provided by Technical and Financial Partners (TFPs) for other purposes. If this is the case, it constitutes both abuse of corporate assets and embezzlement of public funds, used for electoral corruption.
MONITORING OF ELECTORAL EXPENDITURES
Assessment of campaign expenses conducted by Candidates No. 3, No. 11, and No. 13. Note that this evaluation is based on a conservative range ; the actual figures are likely to be significantly higher.
